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“The animal, what a word!”
  — Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am
riting about animals has been a distinguishing trait of 
Canadian literature from nineteenth-century writers, such 
as Charles G. D. Roberts, Ernest Thompson Seton, and 
Margaret Marshall Saunders, to more recent authors, such as Farley 
Mowat, Don McKay, and Barbara Gowdy. Don LePan’s novel Animals 
(2009), however, is an animal story with an ironic twist. What are we 
to make of the fact that, despite its title, Animals does not contain a 
single animal, and is even set in a future era when there are virtually 
no animals left on the planet, and yet the question of what it means to 
think of certain creatures as animals is at the core of both the novel and 
the society it depicts? As recent theoretical debates have emphasized, 
this question is more vexed, and more bound up with broader ethical 
implications, than it might initially appear. It is, ultimately, a question 
about the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of categories, and 
about our own unavoidable inscription within these tensions.
In recent years this preoccupation has been paralleled by a corres-
ponding focus within literary criticism.1 For critics, as for so many of 
these novelists and poets, these moral complexities are grounded in 
the central issue of how we think about species-boundaries. Is it more 
accurate, or more productive, to insist on our commonality with ani-
mals (humans as animals), or on the differences that divide humans 
and animals, in order to foreground the power dynamics that structure 
these relations? Is it really possible to assume that we know anything 
about animals without slipping into potentially dangerous forms of 
anthropomorphism? Or, at the other extreme, can insisting on absolute 
difference in ways that negate the threat of anthropomorphism lead 
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to a politics that is grounded, even unintentionally, in an unhelpfully 
patronizing moral stance (what we as humans can do for these creatures 
that are only animals)? Does the temptation to feature animals in nar-
ratives where they figure as implicit symbols of colonized or exploited 
people, or even as innocent but superior people (as with older images 
of the noble savage), not fall into the trap of colonizing and exploiting 
them all over again, even as we enlist them in this emancipatory gesture?
As Susan Fisher suggests in a recent essay on Don McKay, 
even if the literary use of animals does not lead to direct cruelty, 
it is (so the argument goes) not much of a moral advance over the 
early modern view that animals, like the rest of nature, should be 
regarded as the book of the world, placed on earth not merely to 
meet our material needs but to instruct us. (50-51) 
On the other hand, as Fisher asks in a consideration of McKay’s use of 
homologies to preserve a sense of difference in the midst of sympathetic 
attention, are all narratives equally culpable? As Rebecca Raglon and 
Marion Scholtmeijer argue in Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Ecocriticism, “the best nature stories are those that have 
sensed the power of nature to resist, or question, or evade the mean-
ings we attempt to impose on the natural world” (251). Building on 
Raglon and Scholtmeijer’s suggestion, Travis Mason argues that “this 
sense of resisting dominant modes of meaning-construction” is cen-
tral to “a multifaceted inquiry into concerns both cultural and natural, 
both postcolonial and ecocritical” (100). At the very core of these issues 
is the question of what we mean by the word animal and, related to 
that, how we define the we that poses this question. If “the question 
of the animal,” as theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Cary Wolfe 
have suggested, is, in the context of Animals, irreducibly literary (i.e., 
a question about reading), it is at the same time scientific and philo-
sophical but also, as LePan’s novel makes clear, legal and political.2 All 
of this amounts to saying that I want to approach the novel, not by 
re-examining its most pressing concerns — the abuse that is endemic 
in the livestock industry — but by looking at the ways that tensions 
within its narrative structure raise fundamental questions about the 
politics of complicity.
Like Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005), Animals is a dys-
topian account of a future gone badly wrong, in which bio-technical 
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expertise has outstripped moral accountability. After decades of system-
atic intensification, the livestock industry has imploded. Ever since “the 
great extinctions,” as they have come to be remembered, the consump-
tion of meat has become a thing of the past (33). Disease has obliterated 
virtually all animal life, household pets included. Even worse, rapidly 
escalating numbers of children are being born with severe mental dis-
abilities, but the economy has bottomed out, making it increasingly 
difficult to care for these children: “How could you justify putting the 
resources — the time as well as the money — into improving their lot 
when so many of the fully human were in such desperate straits?” (37).
Luckily, this second problem gradually comes to be recognized as 
a solution for the first: a solution, as simple as it is effective, that raises 
without actually acknowledging the network of philosophical questions 
that inhere in the phrase “fully human.” Many of these issues disappear 
as soon as people come to accept a basic categorical refinement. These 
infants with severe disabilities are not humans but “mongrels,” and as 
mongrels, of course, they can, and more importantly should, be treated 
quite differently. On the one hand, this means that they are denied the 
sorts of things that a child might take for granted but which would 
obviously not be appropriate to a mongrel: using cutlery, eating at the 
dinner table, consuming the same food as family members, or sleeping 
in a bed: “To be sure, there were families that would feed it scraps from 
the table. But a line had to be drawn somewhere” (14). But on the other 
hand, it gradually occurs to people that these mongrels are ideally suited 
to filling the emotional vacuum left by the eradication of domestic pets. 
If “the loss of dogs and of cats” is, the people argue, “in its way as great 
a loss to humanity as that of beef or pork or cod or chicken,” mongrels, 
instead of being treated as an enormous social burden, could be used to 
fill this emotional gap (63). The idea is an immediate success: “Almost 
everyone seemed suddenly to agree that mongrels could look cute, and 
many discovered that their warmth and their whimpering could be as 
comforting as that of a Pekinese or a Labrador” (63). 
Liberated from the fetters of outmoded distinctions, people soon 
come to realize that the situation can be most productively confronted 
by viewing things in the radically different light that these new condi-
tions require. Approached in this new, more appropriate way, one good 
idea soon leads to another. If, even after many of them have been adopt-
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ed as pets, “the supply of mongrels had come to exceed the demand,” 
many 
cogent voices plausibly argued that it was merely practical and not 
in any way cruel to look at the big picture, to see the surplus mon-
grels not simply as a key part of a large problem, but as a key part 
of a potential solution to that problem. Rather than letting them die 
often painful deaths due to illness, would it not make sense to har-
vest a proportion of the mongrel population at a somewhat earlier 
stage? That would, it was argued, be a win-win situation. It would 
lead in most cases to a happier end for the mongrels themselves, 
and certainly it would provide at least a partial solution to what was 
being seen as a great crisis in nutrition. (65-66)
As in Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal, the real horror of this solu-
tion lies less in the genocidal implications than in the hyper-rational 
and endlessly well-intentioned tone with which it is related. Not that 
the narrator, Broderick Clark, an outspoken advocate for free-range 
mongrels, can be counted as a blind apologist for this new industry. On 
the contrary, however impatient he may be with those “extremist vege-
tarians” (40) and “cranks” (37) who obstinately deny what has become 
obvious to everyone else (i.e., the fundamental difference between 
mongrels and humans), he is even more strongly opposed to the steady 
reintroduction of the same “cruelties of intensive farming” (144) that 
led to “the great extinctions” in the first place: overcrowding in pens, 
in which mongrels are forced to stand in their own waste, and an over-
reliance on “a daily low-level dose of antibiotics intended as preventa-
tive medicine, and a hyper-antibiotic ‘cocktail’ at the first sign of any 
significant infection in any member of the herd” (103). 
Broderick’s chilling tone of steady but calm disapproval of these 
industrial excesses is balanced by the emotional immediacy of the 
novel’s second narrative, the story of Sam, one of the mongrels, and 
Naomi, the young girl who befriends him after he is left on her family’s 
doorstep one night by his desperately poor single mother. Naomi’s par-
ents at first refuse to take him in — “we can’t keep it, Gnome, you know 
that,” her father tells her after Naomi hears Sam whimpering on the 
veranda outside her bedroom window (48). But in the end, of course, her 
family does take Sam in, the way any decent family with young children 
might adopt a stray kitten that appears on their doorstep. For a while, 
things go well. At first, Sam sleeps down by the furnace, but he is soon 
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allowed to sleep next to Naomi’s bed. Naomi shares her floppy stuffed 
penguin with Sam and reads to him, especially her two favourite books, 
Where the Wild Things Are and Winnie the Pooh. The whole family treats 
him well. They dress him in “a smart, clean overall,” the style of cloth-
ing universally reserved for mongrels, “usually a cheery yellow or green. 
. . . Others might allow their mongrel to go gallivanting about in a dirty 
old grey coverall, but not the Stinsons” (87-88). Furthermore, they rarely 
use a leash on walks “unless propriety demand[s] it.” The Stinsons are 
humane: “They weren’t the sort of family to be always pulling a creature 
this way and that, bossing it about” (88).
Then Naomi realizes with a shock that Sam has learned to speak 
— quite badly, it is true, but recognizably all the same. This is a major 
revelation. The problem is that, diagnostic resources having become 
so limited, deaf children are increasingly dismissed as mongrels, and 
therefore incorrectly classified. But were this error to be recognized, a 
creature’s status would need to be re-evaluated. To be capable of speech, 
everyone agrees, is a sign that the creature is a human rather than a 
mongrel. Sam is just deaf. Naomi is understandably thrilled. Now that 
this is clear, Sam can be adopted into the family as a child rather than a 
pet. But the news touches some sort of horrible nerve with her mother, 
Carrie. Driven by demons from her past, she takes matters into her own 
hands, reassuring herself that it is a parent’s job to make those difficult 
but morally necessary decisions that children are too young to under-
stand. Mongrel pets cannot legally be reclassified as livestock, but, of 
course, if one knows where to look, there are always people who can take 
care of these things. The plot unravels with a horrifying inevitability 
as it follows Sam’s downward path through an industrial farm to his 
final end. The tale is all the more harrowing for Sam’s fragile, stubborn 
innocence. Unable to make anyone listen, he takes useless comfort in 
reciting lines from his favourite books, especially the story of Max, 
who told the wild things to stop and then suddenly wanted to be where 
someone loved him best of all, and who “had sailed back to his very own 
room with the supper his mother had made waiting for him and it was 
still warm, please could it be like that?” (124).
As horrifying as Sam’s individual torment is, his ordeal also stands 
in as a synecdoche for the larger socio-economic decline of a culture 
whose imploding values create the conditions that enable this tragedy to 
occur. Sam’s experience of becoming mongrel (to echo Gilles Deleuze and 
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Félix Guattari’s formulation of becoming animal) epitomizes the broader 
dehumanization of an entire culture. Graham J. Murphy’s analysis of 
David Malouf ’s Remembering Babylon reinflects Deleuze and Guattari’s 
formulation as becoming insect, a term that, like becoming animal, offers 
the possibility of a decolonizing perspective capable of resisting the cat-
egorical impulses of an imperialist hegemony by fostering a space of 
new possibilities “that engender alternate ways of thinking” (Murphy 
76).3 Malouf ’s character, Janet, “perhaps seeing with the eyes of a child, 
constantly struggl[es] with the sense that she can become someone new, 
someone different, someone becoming” (Murphy 82). LePan’s account 
of Sam’s descent from human to mongrel and then to raw material for 
factory farming offers yet another twist — becoming mongrel — but it 
also strips this process of its utopian resonance by highlighting what 
Derrida has insisted on as “the sacrificial structure” of discourses about 
nonhuman animals: “a place left open, in the very structure of these 
discourses (which are also ‘cultures’) for a noncriminal putting to death” 
(“Eating” 112). It is one thing to exist in a state of becoming whose very 
fluidity resists hegemonic pressures; it is quite a different thing, in the 
theatre of global politics, to suffer the consequences of becoming animal 
as a consequence of others’ decisions: as an effect of broader power 
relations rather than as a form of agency (“becoming someone new, 
someone different”). To experience these changes as the object of larger 
hegemonic forces is to recognize first-hand Helen Tiffin’s important 
reminder about “the political history of Western racism and its imbri-
cation with discourses of speciesism; its use of animals as technologies 
of human social division; and above all, perhaps, its metaphorisation 
and deployment of ‘the animal’ as a derogatory term in genocidal and 
marginalising discourses” (32). Animals literalizes Tiffin’s warning in its 
account of Sam’s intensely personal ordeal, but even more insidiously in 
its careful attention to the broader ways that scientific, economic, and 
judicial discourses of the “mongrel” help to sustain these categorical 
impulses.
Sam’s plight carries Tiffin’s warning that “both human genocide and 
human slavery have been, and in some cases continue to be, predicated 
on the categorization of other peoples as animals” (32) to its logical 
extreme, but LePan’s unflinching attention to the processes of categor-
ization that make this possible registers Tiffin’s historical point most 
forcefully in Broderick’s careful explication of the genealogy of the word 
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mongrel, which, he explains, emerged out of the earlier terms mongo and 
mongoid: 
That coinage originated when James Langford Peake published his 
“Inquiry Into the Ethnic Element of Idiocy” in 1870; he quite rightly 
observed the degree to which the creatures he was describing, though 
born to Caucasian parents, resembled the peoples of the Mongo 
River region of North Africa. “Mongan idiocy” was the name he 
gave it. (34)
The postcolonial imperative implicit in Broderick’s uncritical allusion to 
James Langford Peake’s nineteenth-century association of “idiocy” with 
Africans (even when he is actually discussing Caucasians) is reinforced by 
Broderick’s equally detailed account of the historical association of chattel 
— the term used for those mongrels who are destined for consumption 
— with slavery (40). Broderick’s nonchalant acceptance of the ease with 
which “the narrow old categories came to be replaced by the broader and 
more comprehensive ones that reflect our modern understanding” under-
scores the high stakes of Tiffin’s important point “that the line [between 
human and nonhuman animals] is not a fixed, but an always politically 
contingent one, constructed and policed by representation” (LePan 34; 
Tiffin 33).4 “A line had to be drawn somewhere,” Broderick insists, and 
not just drawn but “policed,” which, most fundamentally, means natural-
izing these distinctions so that the work of policing them can be rendered 
invisible (14). As Derrida suggests about the word animal, “it is an appel-
lation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the 
right and the authority to give to the living other” (Animal 23).
Derrida’s insistence on “the sacrificial structure” of discourses about 
nonhuman animals aligns these political issues with the more funda-
mental theoretical question of the rights to ethical consideration that 
must always have been sacrificed or disallowed — the line that must 
be drawn somewhere — in order to establish the very groundwork of 
humanist claims to moral responsibility. “The other, such as this can be 
thought according to the imperatives of ethical transcendence, is indeed 
the other man: man as other, the other as man” (“Eating” 113). Ironically, 
Derrida argues, twentieth-century challenges to humanist assumptions 
have reinscribed these delimitations: 
Discourses as original as those of Heidegger and Levinas disrupt, of 
course, a certain traditional humanism. [But] in spite of the differ-
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ences separating them, they nonetheless remain profound human-
isms to the extent that they do not sacrifice sacrifice. The subject (in 
Levinas’s sense) and the Dasein are “men” in a world where sacrifice 
is possible and where it is not forbidden to make an attempt on life 
in general, but only on the life of a man, of other kin, on the other 
as Dasein. (“Eating” 113)
One irony of recent theoretical challenges to inherited ideas of subjec-
tivity is precisely the extent to which this challenge “continues to link 
subjectivity with man,” reinforcing the human/nonhuman divide even 
as it deconstructs the idea of subjectivity that had, in earlier philosoph-
ical moments, legitimated that divide (“Eating” 105). In other words, 
the revisionary force of this critical challenge is ultimately negated by 
the implicit acknowledgment that it is only human subjectivity that can 
be deconstructed. Critics such as Cary Wolfe and Jodey Castricano have 
argued along similar lines that the historical exclusions perpetuated by 
the humanist tradition have been replicated by a disturbing paradox 
within the cultural studies movement that has challenged it. “Current 
critical practice,” Wolfe suggests, “for all its innovation and progressive 
ethical and political agendas,” is grounded in “a fundamental repres-
sion that underlies most ethical and political discourse: repressing the 
question of nonhuman subjectivity, taking it for granted that the sub-
ject is always already human” (Animal 1-2). Even as poststructuralist 
theorists have insisted on “the raising of unsettling questions of dif-
ference with regard to normalized categories of gender, ethnicity, race, 
class and sexuality,” their revisionary challenge has been undertaken in 
ways that have unthinkingly, but effectively, reinforced older humanist 
assumptions about differences between human and nonhuman animals 
(Castricano 5).
For critics such as Wolfe and Castricano, however, the revisionary 
force of our posthumanist moment has at last begun to dislodge these 
enduring forms of speciesism by “calling into question the boundaries 
that divide the animal kingdom from humanity and by exploring the 
medical, biological, cultural, philosophical, psychological and ethical 
connections between nonhuman animals and ourselves” (Castricano 1-2). 
As Donna Haraway famously argues in “Cyborg Manifesto,” 
By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, 
the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. 
The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not turned 
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into amusement parks — language, tool use, social behavior, mental 
events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human 
and animal. . . . Movements for animal rights are not irrational 
denials of human uniqueness; they are a clear-sighted recognition 
of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture. 
(Simions 151-52)
Animals contributes to this posthumanist challenge not by widening 
the ethical boundaries to include nonhuman animals (and in doing so, 
rejecting the sacrificial structure of Western philosophical traditions, 
from traditional humanism to critics such as Heidegger and Levinas and 
their cultural-studies successors), but by insisting on the arbitrariness 
of the category of “human” in the first place. Fracturing the apparent 
coherence of the “human” as a category by highlighting the fallibil-
ity and the politically fraught nature of this designation dislodges the 
rationale for sustaining human/nonhuman oppositions. In doing so, 
LePan’s narrative ultimately converges with the efforts of posthuman-
ist critics by insisting on the philosophical necessity of including non-
human animals in the designation of the Other to whom we remain 
morally responsible.
Crucially, Animals’s satirical force focuses not only on the conse-
quences of inherited designations, but also, even more radically, on 
the social dynamics that helped to ensure their origin and which have 
contributed to their enduring influence. The description of Sam’s last 
days offers a powerful indictment of industrial farming practices, but, 
in many ways, the more fundamental questions raised by the novel are 
less about a particular industry — as offensive as it may be — than 
about our more general capacity for complicity. “People are quite will-
ing to admit openly that they more or less know that what they are 
doing is hideously wrong,” Broderick tell us; “They just don’t want 
to really know” (44). This willing suspension of disbelief — our cap-
acity not to really know — surfaces most forcefully in the novel’s pre-
occupation with categories and with names, in the title itself but also 
throughout the narrative as a whole. If the differences between humans 
and mongrels must be everywhere patrolled and reinforced, the agri-
cultural breakthrough in harvesting mongrels requires a further lin-
guistic revision. Those mongrels that are destined to be eaten become 
referred to as chattel: “Everyone agreed you couldn’t dress a mongrel 
like a human, and everyone agreed you couldn’t dress it like a chattel 
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in a finishing pen either, which is to say, to keep it mostly or entirely 
unclothed” (87). Once harvested, the meat becomes subject to further 
euphemistic revision: it is called yurn in North America and fland in 
Britain and Australia (68). 
The resistance with which characters respond to anything that might 
unsettle these categories, from the general consensus that develops to 
the various individuals who fail to correct their positions once they have 
realized that Sam can speak, demonstrates the fundamental import-
ance of these categories. Complicity, in other words, emerges not just 
as self-serving indifference — knowing without really knowing — but 
as active resistance to what Peter Stallybrass and Allon White describe 
as a liminal form of the grotesque, not as the monstrous Other — the 
wholly foreign or extreme opposite of everything we embrace as normal 
— but “as a boundary phenomenon of hybridization or inmixing, in 
which self and other become enmeshed in an inclusive, heterogeneous, 
dangerously unstable zone” (193). Distinguishing between these “two 
quite distinct kinds of ‘grotesque,’” Stallybrass and White argue that 
various processes of hybridization inherent in bourgeois society pro-
duced “new combinations and strange instabilities in a given semiotic 
system” that exceeded the traditional oppositions of polite/vulgar, high/
low, or culture/anarchy (193). Whereas the first, more straightforward 
version of the grotesque reaffirms our normative judgments through 
the oppositional logic it enacts, the second, more complex version of the 
grotesque as a liminal phenomenon unsettles the very possibility of these 
sorts of coherent logical oppositions. In the futuristic dystopia conjured 
by LePan, it is precisely the hybrid nature of Sam in particular, but also 
of mongrels generally, that must be resisted and rewritten as absolute 
difference. Whatever threatens the coherence of these categories must 
be forcibly expelled as wholly Other. 
The depiction of Sam becoming mongrel — a definitional shift in 
process — highlights both the contingency of these categorical bar-
riers and the ideological resources invested in sustaining them. On the 
one hand, the distinction between human and mongrel that licenses 
these practices is treated as a purely ontological difference: they are 
fundamentally different orders of beings. But, on the other hand, these 
categorical differences circulate as pragmatic epistemological necessities. 
“There was so much change going on,” Broderick explains, “changes in 
classification systems and linguistic changes quite as much as changes in 
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societal attitudes and changes in circumstances for the mongrels them-
selves” (38). The transition proves to be remarkably easy, once public 
opinion has been “nudge[d]” in the right direction:
It did not take much of a nudge to tip public opinion into an 
acceptance of the appropriateness of considering a mongrel-centred 
solution to the perceived nutrition problem. To be sure, a few dis-
senting voices were raised. But remarkably quickly, the stage of 
open debate came to an end. Either no one was sending letters 
to the editor or calling in comments, or else the editorial staffs 
had simply stopped publishing and airing the views of dissenters. 
However it happened, the debate went away surprisingly quickly. 
(66)
Eventually, “many people began to think of mongrels as less than fully 
human — and before long, as not human at all” (61). Broderick never 
pauses to ask what it means to be “less and less human” — or whether 
it is theoretically possible to cross this divide by degrees, to gradually 
become something ontologically distinct. 
The singularity of the name itself — mongrels — implies some sort 
of unifying essence that is everywhere belied by the extent to which it 
functions as an umbrella term, conveniently gathering together a whole 
range of distinct conditions, which now no longer needed to be thought 
of with any kind of specificity: “people with Peake’s Syndrome, people with 
Gyberger’s Syndrome, people with Sellars’ dystrophy, people with Wilson’s 
Disorder, so many of them now seemed such a mouthful” (62). The 
boundaries are helpfully elastic.
As economic conditions changed, and particularly after the great 
extinctions occurred,” more and more conditions are consigned to 
the status of mongrel. With “significant nutritional shortages and 
with medical resources so scarce, it seemed to everyone’s advantage 
to keep to a minimum the number of humans suffering from condi-
tions that were expensive to treat. . . . And many who would in an 
earlier age have been classified as suffering from one or other of a 
long list of abnormalities were more and more frequently lumped 
in with the class of mongrels and chattels. (33) 
It becomes a question of pragmatics: “If the reality for those affected 
by Gyberger’s Syndrome and Peake’s Syndrome and Wilson’s Disorder 
and dozens of others were broadly similar, then for functional purposes 
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these could reasonably be regarded not as three or four or twenty or 
thirty categories, but as one. . . . As more and more people realized, 
there was little point in splitting hairs” (39). The language is insidious. 
What does it mean to say that these various illnesses “could reasonably 
be regarded not as three or four or twenty or thirty categories, but as 
one,” or to imply in passing that scientific decisions with moral implica-
tions could be adequately made in response to “functional purposes”? 
Arbitrary distinctions become absolute without the question ever being 
raised of how such terms can be located on some sort of continuum 
or accommodated through a shift in perspective. These issues are not, 
however, as unrealistic as the novel’s dystopian style might suggest. As 
Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin insist, in the context of their broader 
argument about the history of racism,
the fiction that the species boundary is a fixed one . . . is reproduced 
through the language we use in spite of our knowledge that some 
peoples considered ‘human’ by some have been dubbed ‘animal’ by 
others; and in spite of our awareness that the species boundary is 
not fixed at all, but always temporally and politically contingent, 
continually constructed and policed by the processes of representa-
tion itself. (135)
The danger of approaching these ideas through satire, of course, is the 
tendency of satire to foster a sense of moral self-righteousness in its read-
ers. How could people behave so badly, fool themselves so deliberately, 
manage to know without really knowing, we might ask, the way that we 
often do (to take the classic example) when confronted with questions 
about people’s complicity with the Nazi Holocaust. How, we want to 
know, could people have accepted something so evil? Why did they not 
behave more as we would have done, were we in their shoes? Rather than 
allowing the reader this sort of easy, and counterproductive, get-out-of-
jail-free card, the novel repeatedly implicates us in these issues, begin-
ning with the title itself, which forces us to reflect on our own categor-
ical judgments. Whether one insists, along with posthumanist scholars, 
that the human/animal divide has been so thoroughly breached that 
one can now only speak of human and nonhuman animals, or whether 
one insists on the political efficacy of retaining this divide in order to 
foreground ethical questions about what it means to speak for animals, 
one is necessarily forced to confront the political implications of these 
choices.5 The ambiguity of LePan’s title enforces a recognition — as 
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soon as we pose the question of whether there are any animals in the 
novel and regardless of how we answer it — that we are always already 
caught up within the classificatory dynamics that constitute the foun-
dation of the book’s political questions. Once lines have to be drawn, 
there can be no politically uncompromised positions. To insist, as I have 
from the outset, that Animals does not contain a single animal invites 
a recognition of the ease with which well-intentioned perspectives can 
be implicated in the mindset of those characters whose limitations we 
are invited to condemn. Our complicity begins, in other words, as soon 
as we ask, or fail to ask, the questions about animals (with all of their 
historical and philosophical implications for what counts as non-animal) 
that the simplicity of the title necessarily implies. 
Nor is our inscription in these dynamics always quite so subtle. 
Taking umbrage at the fact that “the ‘enlightened’ populace of, say, a 
century ago would be appalled were they to see the practices of today 
when it comes to the treatment of mongrels and chattels,” Broderick 
responds:
They might do well to remember how economics and expediency 
shaped their own practices with regard to their fellow creatures. To 
remember how, over the course of a little more than half a century, 
they had quietly changed virtually every aspect of the lives of the 
creatures whose milk they drank and whose flesh they ate. People 
for the most part forget history. (39-40) 
Even worse, “people in those days had not the excuse of a twenty-year 
depression and an environmental upheaval such as the one that was 
caused by the great extinction of species” in the first place (41). For good 
measure, Broderick quotes a Margaret Wente column from the Globe 
and Mail which insists, with typical Wente bravado, that
most of what we do to animals before we eat them isn’t nice. 
If we knew exactly how they lived and died, we’d be horrified. 
Fortunately for us, we’re so removed from where our food comes 
that we can choose not to know. Ignorance is bliss, and I, for one, 
am a devoted carnivore. I have studiously tried to avoid learning 
about the revolting details of factory farming, because if I knew, 
then I would have to stop eating meat and start sending money to 
the animal-rights movement, or at the very least search out meat 
that had an okay life. That would be hard. It’s easier to be a hypo-
crite. (43-44)
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Living in the age in which livestock abuses produced “the great extinc-
tions” that necessitated the consumption of chattel, Broderick suggests, 
we cannot congratulate ourselves on occupying any sort of moral high 
ground.
Ironically, though, Broderick is himself the best evidence of the ways 
that forgetfulness enables complicity. Having recalled researchers’ much 
earlier discovery that “the biological basis for” Peake’s syndrome was “an 
odd number of chromosomes,” Broderick insists that these researchers, 
having gone to “all that effort and all that research,” “failed to see it in 
its true light, as confirmation of the simple fact that mongans — and 
mongrels generally, had they been classifying things at that time in the 
broader fashion we have come to understand as more appropriate — 
were simply not fully human” (36). As Haraway argues in When Species 
Meet, “the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 
percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body, 
. . . [that] the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of 
bacteria, fungi, protists, and such” casts into question the coherence of 
the phrase “fully human.” However, this phrase circulates throughout 
the novel as an authoritative and — for characters such as Broderick 
— unexamined concept, ensuring the possibility of absolute difference 
(3). Explaining the next major shift — cloning mongrels to help supply 
the renewed demand for livestock — Broderick explains that “mongrels 
were not humans, and as that simple fact came to be widely and then 
near-universally accepted, the grounds for opposing research into mon-
grel reproductive cloning dropped away” (80).
However blind Broderick may be to this categorical slide, from the 
human to the “not fully human” to simply “not human,” and however 
untroubled he may be by the steady addition of various disorders to 
the term “mongrel,” what makes his progressive stance as an advocate 
for these free-range livestock practices so unsettling may actually be its 
internal coherence — that is, if you grant him his starting assumptions. 
Far from being cruel, he insists, the very opposite is true: “the twentieth 
and early twenty-first century practice of treating several varieties of 
mongrel as fully-fledged humans was as ruinously expensive as it was 
psychologically painful” (33). Rather than treating the shift as some sort 
of dangerous innovation, Broderick suggests, the rise of the term “mon-
grel” and the practices associated with it represent a turn back toward a 
much earlier and healthier approach. Back in the day “when Peake [had] 
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identified these creatures . . . as a sub-species they were understood not 
to be human, or at least not to be human in the same way and to the 
same extent as you and me,” but the “key point” was that “nature was 
allowed to take its course”:
Mongans in the nineteenth century were not subjected to unnatural 
cruelty, subjected to systematic mistreatment and crammed onto 
factory farms as they are now. But nor were they given a lot of spe-
cial treatment to make them live artificially long lives. (34)
Twentieth and early twenty-first century attitudes and care practices, 
with the “vast amounts” that was being spent “on researching their con-
dition and on trying to lengthen and improve their lives,” with special 
schooling and therapy and the careful language that came to be insisted 
on (what Broderick dismisses as “the social services double speak of the 
era” [35]) emerges as the well-intentioned but cruel exception, the brief 
historical blip when “nature was [not] allowed to take its course,” in 
large part because of people’s insistence on lying to themselves about the 
truth of things. Shackled by the pressures of this “social services double 
speak,” people acknowledged that the sorts of individuals who would 
come to be identified as mongrels were “‘slower’ than others, subject to 
language and cognitive ‘delay.’” But it was rarely admitted, Broderick 
insists, that, “however much they might slowly improve, the cognitive 
and language skills of many mongrels would never reach the level of the 
average pre-schooler” (35). 
That determination to prolong these wretched lives must be dis-
missed, Broderick explains, not as an act of caring or love, but as a 
unique version of liberal guilt: a form of self-indulgence based on an 
unwillingness to confront the reality of the situation and to let nature 
take its course in light of that reality. But, fortunately, “in the mid-
twenty-first century, of course, the pendulum started to swing back 
towards where it had been in the nineteenth century — at least when it 
came to the treatment of mongrels” (37). Faced with growing economic 
pressures, the public mood gave way to “what one might call necessary 
neglect. . . . And so, slowly but surely, mongrels lost that ‘sensitive sup-
port’ that had nurtured the development of their mental abilities in gen-
eral and their verbal skills in particular” (37). In strictly scientific terms, 
it was possible, of course, to insist on the legitimacy of the sorts of 
highly nuanced distinctions between various conditions that twentieth 
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and early twenty-first century scientists had embraced, but, Broderick 
insists, this search for taxonomical detail ignored the larger question: 
Did the struggle to be ever more precise, to categorize things in an 
ever narrower and narrower fashion always serve a useful purpose? 
And how much truth did the conclusions capture? You could make 
a plausible case on either side of an issue like that, but over time a 
consensus emerged that the sort of classification system that made 
the greatest sense in the real world in a case such as this was the 
one that best harmonized both with underlying categories and with 
the realities of what would constitute appropriate and acceptable 
treatment for these various related types. (38-39)
Fortified by this managerial doublespeak, Broderick insists that a truly 
ethical stance must be grounded on a frank recognition of the reality of 
the situation, rather than on the kind of self-deception practised by ear-
lier, and supposedly more “sensitive,” advocates for the victims of these 
various disorders. Once that reality has been fully accepted — namely, 
that mongrels are not human and therefore perfectly legitimate candi-
dates for consumption — one can develop a truly progressive politics 
about how this might best be done.
Except, of course, there is Sam, whose transformation we are forced 
to witness, as his changing conditions make him “less and less human” 
in the eyes of those around him (17). Ironically, even as Sam’s treatment 
moves him “steadily further away from the realm of the human,” he 
becomes increasingly articulate, both in his capacity to understand the 
world around him and, eventually, in his ability to speak (18). Through 
Sam, we gain a first-hand account not of how he changes, but how the 
world around him changes: “It was strange how people dealt with him, 
now that he was not the lowest member of a family of poor humans, 
but something else, something a notch lower than that” (52). As in so 
many other literary texts, Animals offers the child’s perspective as a mor-
ally superior alternative. Having befriended Sam, Naomi cannot help 
wondering, “How different was he? How different were all of them, the 
mongrels? Maybe they weren’t really that different at all, maybe they 
could think things and feel things almost as we can. . . . And for sure 
some mongrels could say some things as well as understand things, 
they were sort of animals but sort of humans too. They just hadn’t been 
taught to do things; maybe she could be a teacher” (76, 78). Whereas 
adults behave according to what Broderick calls “some unacknowledged 
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societal logic,” which insists, above all, on the coherence of categorical 
distinctions (the line which “had to be drawn somewhere”), Naomi and 
Sam arrive at radically different moral conclusions. The books that Sam 
identifies with most of all — Where the Wild Things Are and Winnie 
the Pooh — intensify the novel’s pathos by accentuating his emotional 
depth, but they also depict curiously anthropomorphized worlds domin-
ated by creatures that similarly resist the impulse to distinguish between 
human and animal. Indeed, the appeal of these books lies in their ability 
to conjure up precisely the condition that Naomi attributes to Sam and 
to mongrels generally: “sort of animals but sort of humans too” (78). 
But even this is not so simple. 
LePan’s use of free indirect discourse underscores the morally revolt-
ing truth of the factory farming conditions that Sam ends up experien-
cing, and of the hypocrisies that enable these conditions to continue, 
by filtering them through the vulnerable and innocent perspective of 
a child. In Sam’s reaction, we receive an unmediated glimpse into the 
true cost of these practices — except, of course, and this is where the 
question of complicity most fully engages the reader, it is all a lie. Or 
not a quite a lie but, if we bear in mind the novel’s narrative structure, 
not quite the way that we are asked to believe, either. As Sheryl Vint 
argues, the novel’s split narrative, shuttling between Broderick’s hyper-
rationalist and adult explanation of the history and economic subtleties 
of the situation, and Naomi’s younger and more emotional account, 
reflects the problematic duality that Derrida identified with 
Western culture’s discourse on the animal, polarised between the 
philosophers — who “have no doubt seen, observed, analyzed, 
reflected on the animal” but have never acknowledged that “what 
they call ‘animal’ could look at them, and address them from down 
there, from a wholly other origin” — and the poets — who “admit 
to taking upon themselves the address that an animal address 
to them” but who fail to contest the structural centrality of the 
human/animal boundary to our cultural forms because they do not 
acknowledge this address “as theoretical, philosophical, or juridical 
man, or even as citizen.” (36)
The larger framing structure of Animals may well gesture to what Vint 
describes as the political challenge of “bring[ing] these two kinds of 
discourse together,” but it also highlights the interpretive hazards that 
confront this sort of approach (36). Broderick, it turns out, is Sam’s 
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older brother; Naomi grows up to be a “renowned novelist and professor 
of Creative Writing, who began to make her name in fiction even while 
she was still practicing medicine” (147). “Her reputation as a novelist,” 
Broderick explains, “has been based very largely on the basis of her skill 
with the very sort of shifting third-person narrative — those who don’t 
like it call it ‘slippery’ — that she offers here in recounting the story of 
Sam, and of the formative years of her own life” (147). The two first 
meet during the final stage of her research on this manuscript. After it 
is almost fully completed (but only then), it occurs to her “to look up 
the surviving members of Sam’s family,” which leads her to Broderick. 
They “hit it off immediately” he says, but this does not remove his 
“doubts and reservations” about “the free-wheeling approach she takes” 
(148). His main concern, for instance, is the liberties that Naomi seems 
to take with her own self-representation: “surely the young Naomi she 
imagines as the story draws to a close is in some ways too young. Does 
the Naomi of the final pages you are about to read — almost-a-teenager 
by this time — not seem implausibly young?” he asks us. “Seem still to 
be much like the younger child she was when she first met Sam?” (148). 
He suspects her, in other words, of taking liberties with the truth. And 
he insinuates that we as readers have fallen for it, that we are unable or 
unwilling to separate truth from fiction, which must be the first respon-
sibility of any sort of political intervention. 
But though it goes unsaid, Broderick’s reservation about Naomi’s 
“free-wheeling approach” applies even more to Sam, whose voice is 
almost never his own but Naomi’s imaginative construction. Ironically, 
the very sections of the novel whose power lies in Sam’s emotional 
immediacy — the painful final sections where we witness his patient 
resignation to the factory conditions of the chattel farm — are the most 
highly mediated and even fictitious: not Sam at all but adult Naomi’s 
after-the fact reinvention of herself and of what Sam might have experi-
enced and thought so long ago. Nor do the complications end there. 
Naomi’s account is rigorously separated from Broderick’s, distinguished 
throughout the text by subtitles, but in terms of the actual narrative 
structure, it is also inscribed within Broderick’s. Broderick interrupts 
his own account of these past events to explain his and Naomi’s per-
sonal connection and, more importantly, to remind his audience of the 
importance of their discretion: “unless and until Professor Okun decides 
that she would like to take the further step of publishing the manuscript 
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during her own lifetime, it must remain a private manuscript to which 
you have been permitted access in this context only” (147). He decides 
to permit people access to her manuscript “in this context only” and 
only as long as they agree to respect her desire for privacy, though the 
details of “this context” remain wholly unidentified. He shares it with 
some unspecified audience and then demands, for her sake, that they 
not share it. And this admission becomes, in turn, part of his story. 
All of this is then subjected to a further layer of distantiation. An 
editor’s note at the beginning of the novel insists that “the background 
of how the [Naomi] Okun and [Broderick] Clark manuscripts together 
came into the publisher’s hands is now a matter of public record” (and 
therefore does not need to be shared with us), “as are formal assur-
ances from the publisher as to the appropriate permissions now being 
in place to authorize the combined manuscript being made available to 
the public” (n. pag.). The editor’s note further infers that Naomi has 
since died: “Clark’s advisory from some years ago to the audience he 
was then addressing” — that she had asked that it remain private dur-
ing her lifetime — “is of course now superceded” (n. pag.). So Sam’s 
speech isn’t Sam’s at all but Naomi’s imaginative reconstruction, framed 
by Broderick’s comments in his address to some unnamed audience, 
which, by the time it falls into our hands, has been reproduced by some 
unnamed editor.
These narrative dislocations are reinforced by the différance pro-
duced by the novel’s structure generally, weaving between two discrep-
ant accounts whose stylistic differences seem to interrupt rather than 
complement one another. “I know the story is just getting started,” 
Broderick apologizes at the beginning of his first discourse, “but I want 
to interject here just briefly to sketch some of the historical background 
that the author of the manuscript I’ve presented you with has not both-
ered to fill in” (12-13). “I hope you won’t mind me breaking into the 
story again at this point to offer a few comments,” he says at the begin-
ning of his second discourse, though, ironically, Broderick’s passages 
often turn out to be far longer than the “story” he keeps interrupting 
(31). “I guess I should make clear,” he concedes at the beginning of 
another long explanation of the historical economic realities of the live-
stock industry, “that if none of that interests you — if what you really 
want is to find out about Sam and Naomi, find out how it ends and not 
hear all the whatnot about politics and the rest of it — that’s perfectly 
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all right” (57-58). The irony of Broderick’s good-natured concession 
turns once again on the spectre of our own readerly complicity. To care 
so much about Sam and Naomi — to be so focused on their story and 
“how it ends” — amounts to a willed ignorance about the political and 
socio-economic realities that helped to produce their individual tragedy 
(58). “I have told you a good deal about the history and the current 
practice of chattel farming,” Broderick repeats later in the text. “Many 
of you may feel that I have already told you more than you wanted to 
know. And if that is the case, I do invite you to skip past these next 
few pages — as I invite you throughout to skip past such intrusions” 
(97). The imbalance between these “intrusions,” which we are repeat-
edly invited to skip past, and the real story they continually interrupt 
is compounded by the endless footnotes (many of which run for pages) 
that Broderick attaches to both his own and Naomi’s narratives. Nor 
is the status of these footnotes self-evident. A parenthetical comment, 
apparently by the unnamed editor, at the beginning of another footnote 
explains that “here and elsewhere where footnotes to Broderick Clark’s 
material appear in these pages, they have unless otherwise indicated 
been supplied by Clark” (33).
These various tensions between the novel’s form and content 
reinforce, rather than cancel out, the novel’s message by enjoining an 
ethics of reading that forces readers to become a better critical thinkers, 
the way that characters in the story (and, by extension, we ourselves) 
fail to be — knowing without really knowing. Recognizing that we 
have to read the story against the grain of its own apparent consistency 
(in the case of Sam’s account), and despite the deferrals and differences 
set up by the différance of its own structure, highlights the difficulty 
but also the importance of not taking things for granted, especially the 
sorts of distinctions that are implied by the settled public opinions of 
Broderick’s age and the sly duplicity of the narrative structure. Both 
turn out to be unreliable, but, even so, it can be hard work resisting 
entrenched assumptions. The novel’s form and content converge in their 
shared emphasis on the need for critical vigilance in worlds, both social 
and textual, where it can be too easy to leave these sorts of distinc-
tions unquestioned. As readers, we remain irreducibly bound to the 
same interpretive challenge of negotiating categorical instabilities that 
confronts the characters whose choices we are invited to judge. Casting 
its own textual coherence into doubt even as it raises questions about 
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certain industrial practices, Animals warns us — as readers of this par-
ticular text and of the world around us — that we remain bound to 
respond with critical thoughtfulness even as we recognize the capacity 
for complicity that haunts this responsibility at every turn.
Notes
1 The most significant contribution in recent Canadian literary criticism is the essay 
collection Other Selves: Animals in the Canadian Literary Imagination, though the question 
has also been raised in a number of other critical contexts, often within the broader context 
of “Nature Writing.” See, for instance, Christopher Irmscher’s chapter on “Nature Writing” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Canadian Literature; Alec Lucas’s entry on “Nature Writing 
in English” in The Oxford Companion to Canadian Literature; Gerald Lynch’s entry on 
“Animal Stories” in the Encyclopedia of Literature in Canada; and W. H. New’s section on 
“Nature Stories” in A History of Canadian Literature.
2 See Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with 
Jacques Derrida”; see also Cary Wolfe, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal.
3 For a related study that applies Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of “becoming 
animal” to the issue of our ethical relations to non-human animals, see also Lori Brown, 
“Becoming Animal in the Flesh: Expanding the Ethical Reach of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Tenth Plateau.”
4 Animals also emphasizes the role of class in these dynamics, from the massive social 
inequalities that fostered many of the pressures that lead to these changes, to the active role 
played by corporate interests in the legitimation of mongrel consumption and in the return 
to intensive factory-farming conditions.
5 For an approach that insists on the animal-human divide as the necessary basis for 
an ethical politics, see Janice Fiamengo, “‘The Animals in This Country”: Animals in the 
Canadian Literary Imagination.” See also the two special issues of Mosaic that focus on 
“The Animal” (McCance).
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